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INTRODUCTION:
STAYING OUT OF COURT
The ways court procedures can be avoided is a classical theme in socio-legal
studies and criminology. The preface to a book published on that theme by
the Erasmus School of Law in 1988, on the occasion of its 25th anniversary,
covers the then dominant view very well: ‘[T]hey [people who advocate out
of court settlements, RvS] consider the judge as an ultimum remedium. And
that is how it often should be’.1 Topics covered in that jubilee volume ranged
from arbitration and administrative regulation to diversion and alternative
dispute settlement. Now, however, it is striking to see that not only the
topics in this issue of the Erasmus Law Review differ substantially from
those of twenty years ago but that the tone is also quite different. The initial
optimism and the belief that avoiding formal court procedures is essentially a
good thing seem to have made way for a more sceptical attitude. Here it is
questioned whether extra-legal regulations and out of court settlements
actually do diminish the number of court procedures and whether this would
be desirable. Marc Loth’s argument is the most explicit, but in more implicit
ways it is echoed in each of the contributions.
In many ways, this change follows the general development in socio-
legal studies and criminology, which is notably influenced by the fact that
we have more experience with out of court settlements and know through
research how they work in practice. In the 1970s, the plea for out of court
settlements often emerged from discontent about the dysfunctionality of
mainly criminal law. Critics argued that there are better ways to solve
conflicts, ranging from decriminalisation and diversion to informal dispute
settlement.2 Albeit in a very balanced way, this positive tone is maintained in
Judith van Erp’s contribution on reputation sanctions (also called ‘naming
and shaming’).
1 H.J. Snijders, C. Fijnaut, H.Th.J.F. van Maarseveen, and R. Zwitser,
Overheidsrechter gepasseerd: conflictbeslechting buiten de overheidsrechter om
(Arnhem: Gouda Quint 1988).
2 L.H.C. Hulsman, ‘Kriteria voor strafbaarstelling’, E. André de la Porte (ed.),
Strafrecht te-recht? Over dekriminalisering en depenalisering (Baarn: Anthos
1972), 80 and N. Christie, ‘Conflict as property’, (1977) 17 British Journal of
Criminology 1.
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In the early 1980s, Donald Black3 demonstrated that, next to benign
reasons to stay out of court, people mostly took the law into their own hands
because they perceived justice as being unavailable to them. As an example
of this unavailability of law, Black referred to the settlement of conflicts that
arose from an illegal transaction (e.g. a failed drugs deal). If people did not
have a plausible story or perceived their opponent to be too powerful, they
also often refrained from formal litigation, as is the case when law
enforcement arrives too late to solve the problem or if one does not trust the
prevailing legal order.4 The debate on private justice as such is not dealt with
in this issue, but the idea that certain people have an interest in avoiding
formal justice certainly is – as Judith van Erp and Nicholas Dorn
demonstrate with regard to business corporations and private intelligence
companies, respectively.
The real watershed in the debate was caused, however, by Stanley
Cohen’s seminal book Visions of Social Control in 1985.5 After analysing all
the diversion programmes, non-custodial sanctions, and other out of court
settlements, Cohen concluded that these initiatives had merely become ‘add-
ons’ that had widened the net of social control and tightened the mesh so that
even the smallest ‘fish’ were caught. As a result, the criminal justice system
caseload was by no means reduced. The argument is dealt with most
explicitly in this issue’s contribution by Wim Huisman and Monique
Koemans, which discusses various new administrative regulations that are
aimed at replacing formal court procedures. However, the article also
supports Marc Loth’s analysis.
Another phase that can be distinguished is David Garland’s6
assessment of the predicament that currently confronts law enforcers: they
seem unable to control crime and insecurity adequately. One of the
responses to this quandary is the ‘responsibilisation’ of other, mostly non-
legal agencies. In this respect, we can point – as Huisman and Koemans do –
to the enhanced importance of local authorities and civil society or – as Van
Erp does – to governmental control bodies on financial fraud, food safety,
compliance, and corporate governance. One consequence of these
‘responsibilisation strategies’ is that a large number of cases are dealt with
outside of court, at least initially, since conflicts that arise from these
settlements indeed often lead to new court cases.
3 D. Black, ‘Crime as social control’, (1983) 48 American Sociological Review 34.
4 Not everybody is in the position of the Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi.
He has regularly claimed that all the judges are against him, and in July 2008 he
changed the law to create his own immunity.
5 S. Cohen, Visions of Social Control: Crime, Punishment and Classification
(Cambridge: Polity 1985).
6 D. Garland, The Culture of Control (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001).
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A next important new field in which a move away from formal law
enforcement can be observed is the changing nature of policing. In their
book Policing the Risk Society,7 Richard Ericson and Kevin Haggerty argue
that rather than the traditional criminal investigation into individual
offenders, policing today is more about crime mapping and ‘knowledge
broking’. Policing is moving away from servicing the prosecution and trial
of offenders and increasingly follows the rationale of intelligence. It is,
moreover, no longer an issue solely for the state but also includes a growing
number of private partners. According to Ericson and Haggerty, the private
security sector is hired first as a provider of risk taxation and control
techniques; its second task is to do the ‘dirty work’ that state agencies are
not allowed to do; its third function is to do the ‘cheap work’, for which
police officers are overqualified. This informal processing of data and
managing risks is touched upon in Judith van Erp’s contribution and is
referred to at the beginning of Nicholas Dorn’s analysis.
Dorn also addresses a possibly even more complex phenomenon: the
globalisation of this new style of crime control– i.e. through intelligence and
risk management – makes judicial scrutiny even harder. States that hire
private military contractors, such as Blackwater, to do the ‘dirty work’ in the
‘war on terror’ have made painfully clear how difficult it is to hold these
companies accountable for their acts – i.e. a fatal shooting of 17 people in
Iraq. In this particular case, the employees could only have been brought to
justice if Blackwater had been contracted by the Defence department and not
by any other state agency.8 This is not just an American anomaly: private
contractors who operate abroad in Dutch service generally also have
immunity from local prosecution, whilst it is also very difficult to prosecute
them according to Dutch law. The Dutch Advisory Council on International
Affairs, which was asked for its advice, holds such immunity to be
unacceptable and proposes that Dutch law should be applicable if the
protection offered by international public law is ‘manifestly deficient’.9 Also
in the case of Frontex, a new European, intelligence-driven hybrid between
a military and a police organisation responsible for risk analyses and
coordination on the level of the European Union,10 it is still unclear to whom
it is accountable. We only know that the member states do not have ultimate
7 R.V. Ericson and K.D. Haggerty, Policing the Risk Society (Oxford: Clarendon
1997).
8 In October 2007, the US Congress voted for the expansion of the Military Extra-
territorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) to become applicable also to contractors who
work for other US organisations (The Washington Post, 5 October 2007), but as yet
no contractor has been prosecuted.
9 AIV, De inhuur van private militaire bedrijven: een kwestie van
verantwoordelijkheid (The Hague: Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (AIV)
no. 59, december 2007).
10 Established by Council Regulation (EC) No.2007/2004 of 26 October 2004.
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control over Frontex. It is not easy to hold institutions, such as the World
Bank, accountable if they have been criminally negligent11. These are just a
few examples of how the phrase ‘staying out of court’ could acquire a
fundamentally different meaning; the list of global actors that cannot easily
be held accountable for their acts could be expanded in extensor.12
I will conclude here with a brief overview of what is to follow in this
issue of the Erasmus Law Review. In the first article, Marc Loth argues that,
despite the increased importance of out of court settlements, there is actually
no decrease in the number of court cases in the Netherlands. Moreover, Loth
claims there are good reasons to insist on judicial scrutiny in many instances.
In the second article, Wim Huisman and Monique Koemans examine the
Dutch ‘import’ of various administrative measures of Anglo-American
origin that were introduced to increase the efficacy of the fight against
everyday nuisance and against organised crime. Because these measures
implicitly widen the scope of criminalisable behaviour, they potentially lead
to more rather than to fewer court procedures. In the third article, Judith van
Erp examines the ‘naming and shaming’ of various regulatory bodies that are
aimed at the prevention of mainly corporate crime. For the business
community in particular, loss of reputation is far more damaging than fines
or other penalties. Though these control agencies traditionally work in an
informal manner, Van Erp observes a tendency towards formalisation.
Nevertheless, only when there is more transparency as well can legal
procedures and indeed sanctions be made redundant. In the fourth and final
article, Nicholas Dorn examines the integration of public and private
intelligence, and concludes that the role of the latter is best limited to
informing and supporting state agencies if we still are to take the word
‘accountability’ seriously. More convergence between the two types of
intelligence will leave less room for dissenting opinions and indeed for
judicial scrutiny.
René van Swaaningen
11 D.O. Friedrichs and J. Friedrichs ‘The World Bank and Crimes of Globalization:
A Case Study’, (2002) 29 Social Justice, 13.
12 P. Andreas and E. Nadelman, Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime
Control in International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press 2006).
